It is therefore not much of a stretch to imagine Galloway and Wark, who both teach in New York City, hunched together over coffee at an intellectual variant of Central Perk. Yet, when delving into the books, one is first struck by the differences between the projects and their respective tones. This difference goes beyond the stylistic to the approach itself, which is to say that style and substance are conjoined in both works, although perhaps in unexpected ways. Reductively put, one is a playful book about serious objects and the other is a serious book about playful objects. In his introductory chapter, 'How to Occupy an Abstraction', Wark sets out his aim for Telesthesia: to practice 'low theory', 'somewhere in the margins between institutional forms of writing', in a way that is 'speculative, playful, tactical'. (12) Galloway's work, by contrast, might fit better into what Wark calls High Theory (low theory is never capitalised), the kind of theory that lists proper names attached to institutional knowledge. Indeed, Galloway takes his-and our-intimate knowledge of the high theorists as a given, skipping effortlessly from the Greeks to twentieth--century continental philosophers and twenty--first--century network theorists. Wark, on the other hand, states baldly in his chapter on object--oriented ontology, 'I am not a philosopher', (156) a statement enacted as much as underscored by his breezy rhetorical style and the subdivision of Telesthesia into nineteen short chapters, each with a disarmingly witty, enigmatic title (the second chapter is called 'Fresh Maimed Babies'). While Wark's first--person style trumpets the values that underlie his thinking, it also makes for a rollicking good read as far as intellectual heavy lifting goes. The short chapters, chatty anecdotes and deceptively simple sentences lend themselves to punchy, aphoristic observations about serious socio--political entanglements: 'The work of the military--entertainment complex is two--sided. It has its rational, logistical side; but is also has its romantic, imaginative side. The latter invents reasons for the former to exist.' (81) The Interface Effect, by contrast, sticks to four appropriately sized chapters, bookended by an introduction that begins with a return to Lev Manovich's The Language of New Media and a postscript that takes up the issues of race, class and identity politics in digital culture. 2 Along the way, Galloway's style often bends under the effort of his thinking, even as he turns his attention to unexpectedly light objects of serious pop culture, like Norman Rockwell's self--portraiture, the massive multiplayer online game World of Warcraft, Frank Gehry's Stata Center on the MIT campus and the television series 24. As part of this dilemma, Galloway and Wark share a central concern with control, or the control society's hand--in--glove operation with digitisation. For Wark, the danger of the digital has to do with the speed and degree to which it has been co--opted by property and the strategies of privatisation that lie behind the ubiquity of competitive gameplay. For Galloway, who is similarly disturbed by ludic capitalism, the key problem is that 'we do not yet have a critical or poetic language in which to represent the control society' (98) and hence we have no way of visualising, or even In a sense, both texts end before they are over. When in Chapter 4 Galloway asks, 'Is 24 a political show?' and then follows with a postscript on the 'Chinese gold farmer' whose raced, classed and monetised spectre 'haunts the world of digital games', (121) he is half--heartedly attempting to inscribe a few of those aforementioned representations into the anti--history of informatics that awaits us.
Wark hits his high mark of serious irreverence well before the end of Telesthesia, when he supplements object--oriented ontology, or (OOO), with his own pragmatic Marxist orientation newly dubbed 'praxis (object--oriented) ', or P(OO) . (161) One rather hopes that came to him in a flash rather than after sleepless nights working it out. Once past the messy business of P(OO), however, Wark, too, has run out of steam except for a chapter that addresses the representational element left aside by Galloway-gender. Although neither book aims for gender critique, Wark's inclusion of it inadvertently raises a larger problem in both about departicularised or de--faced subjectivity. Wark's late chapter 'The Little Sisters Are Watching You' introduces a figure called 'The Girl' but immediately strips her of all particularity: she is 'not necessarily female or even all that young', not necessarily white or even human.
(176-7) She is nothing in effect but the effect (or in psychoanalytic terms, the object--cause) of consumerist desire, a whatever girl. Having stripped her of gender, Wark then proceeds to strip away all the political issues that might tag along with gender: the politics of domestic violence, rape, abortion, wage equality, sexual harassment in the workplace or on the street-the list goes on. Except that the Girl is one of the things that stands in the way of there even being a politics within which such things could be the stakes. (185-6).
In this view gender has so effectively turned itself into surface that it slips all of its own implications-which is where the problem lies.
Even subjects of the digitalised interface cannot so easily lose their hard--lived attunement to gender or race or class or ethnicity. This lack of embodied subjectivity is equally evident in Galloway, who makes the astute point that the stubborn logic of race 'can never be more purely actualized than in a computer simulation'. (132) but is nevertheless unwilling to allow for any subjective codification that is not automatically turned into financial value through being 'captured, massified, and scanned by systems of monetization'. (136) The only out, Galloway suggests, is escape into 'generic fullness' or Giorgio Agamben's 'whatever being' where 'the trick … is to abstain from the assignation of traits'. (140) I worry that in precisely this abstention from traits, assignations, characteristics and subjectivities, we find abstraction running roughshod over particularity. Ultimately there is in both texts a tendency toward explain--everything theorising, a logic of 'thusness' rather than 'thisness' (to adapt Galloway on haecceity, 139), as is evident in Galloway's unnerving tendency to use phrases like 'primordial axiom' and 'hence the following law'. (52, 86) It is this same logic of thusness that ungirls Wark's Girl and allows Galloway to collapse affect with identity before throwing out both with the bathwater of the consumer--clone subject. If this is what is involved in the 'quest for a new master code to unlock interface culture in general' (Galloway 101), then I confess I prefer working in bits. That digitised life suggests a master code to be cracked by critics of a Marxist stripe is a sleight of programming we should refuse.
No doubt my view succumbs in character to what Galloway calls parochialism (31) and Wark bemoans as getting 'lost in the weeds of the everyday', (131) but I suspect that we disregard such detail at our peril. Whatever data my body might manifest online, I do not escape its local, particular and politicised purview. 
